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COMPENSATION FOR TRAFFIC INJURIES:
NEW YORK AND COMPARATIVE
SYSTEMS
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Y.

KING*

The long debate over automobile accident reparation in the
United States, enriched by the contributions of eminent legal scholars,
has reformed some insurers, and educated many consumers, but has
failed to move legislatures to action. In a nation of more than 200
million people, 100 million registered vehicles and an equal number of
licensed drivers,' automobile accidents are responsible for some 56,000
fatalities and 4.6 million injuries annually, at a monumental cost of
16.5 billion dollars. 2 These awesome human consequences are "the
neglected disease of modern society." 3
Federal legislation has attempted to reduce the toll by enacting
measures for highway and vehicle safety. 4 Nonetheless, car manufacturers continue to produce extravagantly powerful engines within
fragile chassis, while the incompetent or criminally negligent driver
continues to operate these vehicles uninhibited by effective national
licensing standards. The slow progress of accident prevention magnifies
the need for implementing a better system of compensation. It is
disappointing that the many years and many volumes of legislative
hearings on the subject of automobile insurance have not produced
proposals for basic reform. It seems redundant at this stage to accumulate more opinions of insurers, disgruntled policyholders, or frustrated
regulators. Legislative and executive initiative should be directed
toward putting before the public constructive and substantive recommendations. It is to be hoped that the Federal Department of Transportation will come forward with proposals based on the excellent
study of automobile compensation it has recently completed.5 At the
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state level, where insurance regulation has been reposed by special
dispensation of Congress, 6 only three significant reparation plans have
emerged.7 Only one of these qualifies as a thorough revision- the
New York Plan, which shall be considered in the course of this article.
It is not difficult to identify one of the causes of legislative timidity.
The organized bar has been critical of comprehensive revision of the
present system. Instead, it has advocated fragmentary procedural and
substantive changes such as voluntary arbitration, comparative negligence, and modest increases in first-party medical coverage. 8 Such proposals probably reflect the attitude of many lawyers who do not
encourage radical departures from accustomed patterns. For the general
practitioner on his own or the small partnership, a little negligence
work helps pay the office rent. His income is often quite modest;
understandably, he would not welcome its diminution by elimination
or significant curtailment of negligence actions. 9
The national and various local bar groups have reacted adversely
to suggestions that all or a portion of personal injury litigation be
transferred to another forum, that proof of fault as a condition precedent to recovery be abrogated in all or some classes of claims, that
contingent fees be subjected to a maximum (below the going rate in
most cases) or be replaced by a "reasonable fee" principle, or that tort
damages for pain and suffering be substantially reduced or abolished. 10
Such reservations entertained by some members of the legal profession
point to a continuation of the split system of accident and liability
insurance rather than adoption of a pure, no-fault system.
These generalized observations upon the need for reform and the
obstacles to achieving it apply in force to New York, sister states, and
probably to most highly developed countries. New York is chosen as an
illustrative jurisdiction because the number of claimants, attorneys and
dollars involved in the business of personal injury lawsuits emphasize
the urgency of seeking a solution. At the same time, by placing accident
compensation in a comparative context, we are aided by the experi6 See The Insurance Antitrust Moratorium Act, 59 Stat. 33 (1945), as amended, 15
U.S.C. § 1012 (1964).
.
7 Massachusetts Personal Injury Protection Plan, ch. 670, [19701 Laws of MaJan. 1, 1971); NEW YORK DEP'T OF INS., AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE . .. FORI W-O T B'I T
(1970) [hereinafter N.Y. PLAN]; CONNECTICUT INS. DEP'T, A PROGRAM FOR AUTOMf,
INSURANCE & ACCIDENT BENEFITS REFORM (1969).
8 A.B.A., REPORT OF THE SPECIAL ComItaTTEE ON AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT REPARTIO-,

1-4 (1969).
9 See generally J. CARUN, LAWYERS ETiICS (1966); J. CARLIN, LAWYERS ON THEIR
OWN (1962).
10 See A.B.A. REPORT, supra note 8.
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ences, perspectives and creative innovations of other communities
equally concerned with mitigating and repairing the human devastation which results from accidental injuries.
AN ULTRAMONTANE VIEW

It is instructive for a jurisdiction such as New York, where substantive revision of automobile liability insurance has been advanced,
to consider the systems of other countries experiencing broadly similar
problems in compensating traffic victims within the framework of tort
law. In England, France, New Zealand, Australia and Canada, liability
insurance is compulsory, or in practical effect compulsory, as it is in
New York. However, the scope of the social security system is much
broader in England, 1 France' 2 and the province of Ontario, s for example, and all or part of the medical expenses and wage loss resulting
from an injury may be covered by some form of social insurance. In
England, one who avails himself of free medical care under the National Health Service is not permitted to claim his medical expenses in
a tort action. Hospital insurance covers nearly all the population of
Canada. In general, a set-off of social security benefits against tort
recovery is required. By contrast, in the United States, a large portion
of the population purchases private medical and hospital coverage, and
the operation of the collateral source rule permits double recoveries for
the same injury. Another difference is the application of a strict rule of
contributory negligence in New York and many other American states
whereas comparative negligence is applied abroad. Other incidents of
traffic injury litigation in the United States- such as contingent fee
arrangements and trial by jury - are either foreign to other systems or
present in a relatively minor degree.
Despite these differences, none of the reparation regimes readily
comparable to American practice seems satisfactory; the sentiment for
reform is international. In Ontario, a select committee recommended
that all automobile policies provide a broad scope of accident benefits
payable without regard to fault. 14 Specific death, medical and disability
benefits were proposed. As enacted, however, limited accident coverage
is to be written on a voluntary basis by private insurers;' 5 the tort
11 See Harris, Analysis of the British Auto Accident Compensation System, in COMPARATIVE STUDIES IN AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT COMPENSATION, COMPENSATION STUDY, at 89.
12See Tunc, Analysis of the French Auto Accident Compensation System, in id.
at 8-9.

13 See Linden, Automobile Insurance Breakthrough in Canada, in id. at 154.
14Id. at 160.

15Id. at 162-64.

NO FAULT INSURANCE

1971]

action is not eliminated and will serve as the vehicle for recovery of
psychic loss. While more injured claimants may be eligible to recover
under the no-fault accident benefits, compensation will be "far from
generous"; 16 and those who do not voluntarily purchase this form of
insurance, as well as pedestrians who are excluded by some insurers,
will not be covered.
Similarly, in British Columbia, the recommendations of the Royal
Commission on Automobile Insurance were more far-reaching than the
program adopted by the legislature. 17 The Commission had proposed
abolishing the fault system and substituting loss insurance, whereby
every traffic victim would recover compensation. The compulsory,
noncancelable insurance would provide a fixed schedule of benefits to
the driver and his family at an estimated premium of sixteen dollars
and seventy-six cents. The legislature, however, preserved the tort
action, necessitating continuation of liability insurance, but did adopt
the principle of no-fault accident benefits and uninsured motorist
coverage.' 8
In New Zealand, the Royal Commission for Investigation of
Industrial Accidents Compensation reported that all accidental injuries
should be compensated regardless of fault. 9 It suggested a government
operated, compulsory loss-sharing system financed by employer contribution of 1 percent of wages and salaries plus a levy on motor vehicle
drivers. Such a broad social security approach to personal injury
reparation has received attention in other countries, including the
United States.20 Advantages of the system would lie in the avoidance of
overlapping premiums and sources of compensation; moreover, there
would be demonstrably lower costs of administration when compared
with private liability insurance.
An accident compensation plan which merits consideration has
been advanced by the famous scholar, Andre Tunc.21 He has proposed
that:
1. Car owners as a class bear the cost of traffic accidents.
16 Id.

at 165.
17 Id. at 167-69.
I8 Id. at 170-72.
19 RiEPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO COMPENSATION FOR PERSONAL
INJURY IN NEW ZEALAND (1967) [the Woodhouse Report]; see also Anderson, The Woodhouse Report on Compensation for Personal Injury in New Zealand, 1 AUcKLAND U.L.

REv. 1 (1969); Mathieson, Royal Commission of Inquiry: Compensation for Personal
Injury in New Zealand, 31 MOD. L. REv. 544 (1968).
20 See W. BLUM 8&H. KALVEN, PUBLIC LAW PERSPECrIVES ON A PRIVATE LAW PROB3LEMI:
AUTro COMPENSATION PLANS 83-85 (1965).
21 See Tunc, supra note 12, at 21-28.
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2. Everyone injured in a traffic accident should receive compensation without regard to fault. Such compensation would cover
medical, hospital and rehabilitation costs, and loss of past and
future earnings. Pain and suffering would not be compensated
unless of a permanent nature. Payments for loss or impairment
of limb would follow a schedule of benefits but with discretion
to depart from the schedule in special circumstances.
3. Faults, which the author distinguishes from errors, should subject the driver to criminal and civil sanctions depending upon
the nature of the conduct causing injury.
4. Car damage resulting from collision should be compensated
automatically above the applicable deductible.
5. The tort liability system would be abolished for traffic accidents.
Professor Tunc's proposal would appear to internalize the cost of
motor vehicle accidents and ensure basic benefits to victims without
proof of blameworthy conduct on the part of the driver. The latter
principle is not a radical departure from present law which attaches
prima facie liability to the "custodian" of a vehicle. 22 Furthermore, in
the author's view, most accidents are caused by inevitable errors which
attend all human activity, and, therefore, attribution of "fault" cannot
survive as a rational criterion of compensation.23
Fundamentally, all of the major reforms, whatever their national
origin, seek to relieve or mitigate the inner tensions of the tort liability
system which both fails to deter and fails to compensate. Liability
insurance insulates the party at fault from the very liability which the
system was designed to enforce, and yet pays out benefits only upon
proof of fault. The system cannot fulfill the social objective of restoring
the injured physically and economically as self-sustaining and productive members of society. On these grounds, the present mechanism must
be replaced by a true compensation scheme. This is the essence of
Professor Tunc's proposal and of the plan recently put forth by the
New York State Department of Insurance.
THE NEw Yonx PLAN

Experience in New York underscores the poor performance of
automobile liability insurance as a compensatory scheme for traffic
injuries. Not only is the prevailing pattern of overpayment of small
22
23

Id. at 3.
Id. at 17.
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claims, underpayment of serious injuries and nonpayment in other cases
repeated in this state,24 but the system is patently inefficient as well as
inequitable. It is estimated that New Yorkers paid 950 million dollars
for automobile liability insurance in 1970. Of this amount, almost 700
million dollars represents premiums for bodily injury liability coverage.25
But only an estimated 100 million dollars was paid out as reimbursement
for net economic loss.26 Out of each insurance premium dollar, 44 cents
is available for accident claims payments; the remaining 56 cents is
allocated for operating expenses incident to the fault system, i.e.,
insurance company costs, paying agents, lawyers and claims investigators. Of the 44 cents for benefits, 21.5 cents go to pain and suffering
awards, 8 cents for economic loss which has already been reimbursed
from other sources. This leaves 14.5 cents for net economic loss, 27 the
most basic and essential compensation to victims. This residual amount
cannot assuage the economic consequences of motor vehicle accidents
for the multitudes injured each year.
The proffigacy, illogic and imbalance of automobile liability
insurance, prompted the Insurance Department of New York to reject
palliatives and piecemeal revision. Instead, a new program is recommended, built on two synergetic principles: compensation (a) for net
economic loss (b) without regard to fault. 28 Under the plan, each motor
vehicle owner would be required to purchase minimum automobile
insurance covering personal injury and property damage (excluding the
vehicles involved in the accident) arising from the operation of the
vehicle. The driver, passengers, pedestrians and property owners could
claim under the vehicle owner's policy. Personal injury benefits would
cover all hospital and medical costs, net economic loss without any
limits, rehabilitation, and out-of-pocket expense. Where property damage results, each vehicle owner would bear the loss to his own car
(optional collision insurance could, however, be purchased) but the
compulsory insurance would cover other property damage.
The glaring omission from the benefits scheme is pain and suffering damages. As a strict economic loss system, it excludes reparation
for the psychic sequelae of accidents, real or imagined. Coverage for
noneconomic loss may be purchased if insurers offer it, but it is not a
component of the basic, compulsory insurance. Its exclusion should
have a salutary effect upon premium charges and reduce the dishonesty
24 N.Y. PLAN
25 Id. at 4.

at 27-29.

26Id. at 36.
27 Id. at 34-36.
28Id. at 83-100.
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and fabrication which have unfortunately become associated with
personal injury claims.
The second essential element of the New York Plan is the abrogation of the proof of fault in the negligence action. The benefits
described above are available to the injured without regard to the
reasonableness of the conduct of the parties involved. Since in New
York, the plaintiff bears the burden of proof not only as to the defendant's negligence but also as to his own freedom from contributory
negligence, more victims will be able to recover under the no-fault
system than under present rules. It should be noted, however, that the
drunken or drugged driver, or one committing a crime, would be held
strictly liable.
The authors of the New York Plan anticipate substantial savings to
policyholders if their scheme is adopted. They project that 57 cents of
the premium dollar would be available to pay net economic loss.2 9 The
savings are predicated on reduced transaction costs (e.g., operating
expenses, claims adjustment expenses), elimination of psychic loss
payments and making the compulsory insurance benefits excess insurance after exhausting other sources of compensation for economic
impairment.
In addition, the proponents claim that by eliminating contests over
fault, payments can be made much more promptly than at present.
Families will not be devastated by long periods without income; early
and comprehensive medical care and rehabilitation will speed the
injured on the road to recovery. Finally, courts will be relieved of the
crushing burden of motor vehicle accident cases which have relentlessly
clogged the dockets in metropolitan areas for several decades. With so
much promise, how can the New York Plan fail to gain acceptance?"
Some of the countervailing forces and arguments will be examined
below.
But the need for procedural reforms, whether as a consequence of
the New York or some other proposed insurance plan cannot be glossed
over if the total picture is to be accurately presented. While advances in
the mechanism of litigation can never take precedence over the enhancement of substantive rights, it is a well-learned lesson of the common law that the two are inextricably related. The severity of the
problem of court delay in New York adds urgency to the search for a
new system of compensation which presages not only a greater measure
of justice but also speedier justice for all accident victims.
29

Id. at 107.

30 For

an evaluation of the plan, see King, Accident Reparation: Reappraisal and
Reform, 3 CoNN. L. REv. 283-92 (1971); see also N.Y. PLAN at 103-29.
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THE PRocnDutRAL PosTuE OF TORT CAsEs IN NEW York
A unified court system was established in the state of New York in
1962. By constitutional provision, responsibility for administrative
supervision of the courts is vested in the Administrative Board of the
Judicial Conference. 31 The Board issues annual reports containing
much statistical data and supporting commentary concerning the nature and volume of the business of the various courts. Since the First
Annual Report in 1956, the Board has monitored delay in state and city
tribunals. Delay is considered to exist for tort actions if the period between filing of the note of issue and trial exceeds six months.32 As of
December 1969, delay in tort jury cases in the supreme court, within
the five counties of New York City, ranged from fourteen to forty-seven
months,3 3 and in the Civil Court of the City of New York from twelve
to fifty months;34 however, by January 31, 1971, the delay in the civil
court had been sharply reduced to a period of from one to twenty-four
months.3 5
The supreme court has original jurisdiction in law and equity, but
as a matter of practice will hear civil claims only if the amount in
controversy is at least 10,000 dollars. Statewide, the supreme court has
an annual intake of more than 60,000 civil cases36 and over 70,000
pending cases. 37 By comparison, the supreme court in New York City
has a civil intake of 24,000 cases of which 13,000 involve negligence
causes of action.38 The Civil Court of the City of New York, serving a
population of more than eight million, has jurisdiction over actions at
law where the recovery sought or the value of property involved does
not exceed 10,000 dollars. 39 Approximately 100,000 tort and contract
cases are noticed for trial each year in the civil court. Of this number,
40
almost half are tort jury cases. The current backlog is 80,000 actions.
For a quarter of a century, court administrators and judges in New
York have struggled to combat lagging tort calendars. 41 They have
tightened procedures at calendar call and made extensive use of pretrial
31 N.Y. CoNsr. art. VI, § 28.
32 N.Y. JiD. CONr.,

FOURTEENTH ANNuAL REPORT 213 (1969).

1-DEc. 31, 1969, at 14 (1970).
34 Id. at 16.
35 Report of the Honorable Edward Thompson, Administrative Judge of the N.Y.C.
38 N.Y. JUD. CoNF., STATISTICAL R]EPORT JULY

Civil Court, Jan. 31, 1971.

36 FOURTEENTH ANNUAL REPoRT, supra note 32, at A 114.
37 Id. at 217.

38 Id.at A 114.
39 N.Y.C. Civ. CT. Aar § 202 (McKinney 1963).
40 See Report, supranote 35.
41 For a review of procedures implemented in the New York courts to reduce the
number of negligence trials, see King, Accelerating Personal Injury Litigation: The
Offer to Compromise and Other Procedures, in N.Y. JUD. CONF., SixxTaT
ANNuAL RnPORT 218 (1971).
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conferences. Such conferences, designed to help the parties reach a
settlement, have disposed of many claims; but, since they are usually
held well before the trial date, numerous cases survive. In some courts,
"blockbuster" parts are regularly conducted. Under this technique, a
number of trial judges are assigned the task of clearing cases which have
aged on the calendar. Success in bringing the parties to agreement lies
in the fact that cases failing to settle may be assigned to trial. The
conference and assignment procedure recently initiated in the civil
court maximizes the psychological effect of imminent trial by immediately assigning the cases which do not settle at conference to a trial
judge. Similarly, the readiness rule requiring certification that all
necessary preparation for trial was completed prior to placement of a
case on trial calendar succeeded for a few years in reducing the pending
caseload. But some relaxation of the rule and some adjustments on the
part of attorneys neutralized its effectiveness. Additionally, some courts
have established medical offices which will suggest names of impartial
medical experts who, upon court request, will examine and report
upon a plaintiff's injuries. As a result, a high proportion of medical
cases which would otherwise produce protracted litigation are settled
without trial.
Other attempts to curtail delay include the implementation of the
six member jury in the civil and other city courts and court rules
limiting overscheduling by trial attorneys who have undertaken the
prosecution or defense of personal injury cases which may be simultaneously called for trial in various courts within the metropolitan area.
There is, however, a disinclination to regiment or penalize the limited
number of skilled trial lawyers who are in demand. There is some
sentiment for encouraging the use of split trials, where the liability
issue is disposed of first, but courts have not imposed this procedure
42
upon the parties.
As further inducements to settle personal injury claims without the
time and expense of a courtroom contest, proposals have frequently
been introduced in the state legislatures to permit interest charges to
run from the date of the injury or the date the action is commenced, or
to impose the opponent's attorney's fees upon a party who has refused a
settlement offer which, upon trial proves to be more favorable than the
actual award. The first suggestion, i.e., prejudgment interest, has been
adopted in a few jurisdictions but without convincing evidence that it
42 Cf. REPORT OF THE COMMI-rEE ON PERSONAL INJURY LITIGATION IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA,
CmD. 3691 (1968) (the Winn Report]. For a discussion of the split trial system in Australia,

see Fleming, Damages: Capital or Rent?, 19 U. TORONTO L.J. 295, 306 (1969).
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has ameliorated the prospect of pretrial settlement. 43 Imposition of
attorney's fees has not been attempted.44
The New York legislature has, however, recently enacted a procedure designed to keep many small claims out of the courts entirely. An
experimental system of compulsory arbitration of claims not exceeding
3,000 dollars will be tried for three years in selected areas of the state.45
The information available indicates that the pilot program will not be
introduced, at least initially, in the New York City metropolitan area.
The appeal from the arbitral award is actually a trial de novo. Therefore, if the rate of appeals is high, there may be no net saving of court
time. It should also be noted that personal injury claims are very likely
to exceed 3,000 dollars. 46 Unless the plaintiff's valuation of his injuries
is scaled down by some court-supervised screening procedure, accident
claims will evade arbitration. The effect of the new law can only be
fairly determined after several years of experience are accumulated.
All of the procedures described above have helped in some measure to reduce the number of court trials in personal injury actions.
But nothing short of mandatory assignment to a simpler tribunal will
eliminate the demands upon the judges and other court employees
which every claim noticed for trial makes. This is so even though the
attorney filing the suit never intends to prove his case before a judge
and jury. Since there has been no demonstrated enthusiasm in New
York or any other American state for establishing a separate forum for
personal injury claims, the only viable alternative is the implementation of a compensation system which obviates the usual issues between
plaintiffs and alleged tortfeasors and leaves only a small residual of
controversies between first parties and their insurers to the courts. The
logical solution to court delay lies in the restructuring of substantive
law to abrogate tort actions for traffic injuries.
SUMMATION

Nations whose economic, legal and social systems afford a ready
comparison with the United States reflect a common disenchantment
43 See McLaughlin, Interest on Personal Injury Claims, 1966 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 65
[I], at 415; Law Revision Commission, Award of Interest on Causes of Action for Personal
Injury, 1966 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 65 [1], at 409.
44 See King, supra note 41, at 224-25, 237-38.
45 N.Y. JUDICARY L. § 213 (McKinney 1968), as amended, ch. 1004, [19 70] N.Y. Laws
(eff. Sept. 1, 1970). For commentary upon the New York compulsory small claims arbitration plan, see King, Arbitration Plus: A Procedural Duo, 25 Racopm oF N.Y.C.B.A. 588
(1970). For a discussion of the third-party claims tribunal in Western Australia, see
Braybrooke, The Motor Vehicle (Third-Party Insurance) Act Amendment Act, 1966-A
NonprincipledDevelopment in Western Australian Law, 8 U. WxsraaN AuSrRAM L. REV.
204 (1967).

40 At least the demand is apt to exceed 3,000 dollars. Information released by the
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with current methods of compensating traffic injuries. We are all
struggling to fulfill a valid social need through the vagaries and contradictions of negligence law and liability insurance. The principle of
liability based on fault developed in a period of industrialization and
laissez-faire economics;4 7 paradoxically, it is in the very sphere of industrial accidents that we have discarded proof of fault as the key to
compensation.
A less comprehensive social security system makes the problem
more severe in the United States than it appears to be abroad although
studies reveal that 57 percent of accident victims in the Toronto area
received no tort recovery, 48 24 percent received nothing and 26 percent
about half their damages in France,4 9 and only 42 percent secured
compensation in the city of Oxford.50 In all of the jurisdictions whose
experiences have been briefly discussed above, there is a complex network of compensation sources sorely in need of rational integration.
The broad scheme suggested in the Woodhouse Report5' seems well
conceived to meet that problem. Yet, there are few champions of an
expanded governmental role in the United States. The New York Plan
relies on private industry to provide the coverage it proposes.
Political philosophy and powerful economic interests influence the
prospects for achieving substantive reform. Some opponents are
sincerely committed to the ethical foundations of the liability system
and conceive of no-fault compensation as enrichment of the guilty. This
view focuses upon the conduct of the tortfeasor and the objectives of
punishment and deterrence. However, by continuing - despite the
countervailing effect of liability insurance - to assign these functions
to tort law we are "overloading" that branch of law. Egregious fault conduct of a criminal or quasi-criminal character - cannot be adequately dealt with in a civil suit between private parties. A satisfactory
compensation system cannot be constructed on the premise that tort
law must serve as a substitute for criminal law.
Of the economic stakeholds which will be shaken by institution of
office of the Administrative Judge of the N.Y.C. Civil Court shows that the average
verdict was 2,400 dollars and the average settlement (no trial) was 1,100 dollars for cases
filed in that court.
47 See THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT

OF THE NEGLIGENCE
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STmUY; Jolowicz, Liability for Accidents, 26 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 50 (1968).
48 REPORT OF THE OSGOODE HALL STUDY ON COMPENSATION FOR VICTIMs OF AUTOMO-

BILE ACCIDENTS ch. IV, at 13 (1961) (concerning motor vehicle accidents in the County
of York).
49 Tunc, supra note 12, at 5.
50 Harris, supra note 11, at 98.
5l Anderson, supra note 19, at 8-13.
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a government-centered compensation scheme or no-fault insurance
privately underwritten, carriers who specialize in liability coverage and
lawyers who concentrate upon negligence cases will be adversely affected. Yet, parts of the insurance industry in the United States support
the New York Plan 2 although it drew sharp criticism from some
organizations of the bar.5 3 If an attorney evaluates reparation reform
solely from his individual income vantage point, he has cause for gloom.
Of necessity it will affect his fees. First, the contingent fee arrangement
will not survive. Although the practice serves as a useful function in
enabling indigent claimants to prosecute negligence claims, the fee has
been recorded as reaching 50 percent in some New York cases 4 and
has prompted institution of some controls by the courts. Secondly,
any new benefits scheme, even if it were to limit rather than abolish
pain and suffering damages, would also curtail the negligence attorney's
income, for general damages are the usual source of his fee. Thirdly, a
compensation plan which enlarges the role of, or concentrates wholly
upon, first-party benefits eliminates recourse to jury trials in most
or almost all cases. Trial lawyers staunchly defend their clients' right
to jury trial; statistics reveal that at least in some courts, verdicts tend
to be much higher than decisions of a judge sitting without a jury.5 0
Perhaps for all of these reasons, lawyers tend to be much more
tolerant of the court delays which characterize negligence cases than are
their clients, court administrators and the public at large. Bound up
as it is with the fortunes of industrial empires and professional careers,
compensation reform is as much a political as a social issue.
Finally, even if New York adopts a far-reaching revision of automobile insurance, we are still faced with the limitations imposed by
our federal system. The plan would be applicable only within the
state, and traditional third-party liability insurance would be necessary
to protect the vehicle owner when his car is driven out of state. Thus,
52 The American Insurance Association, a stock company trade group writing about

one-third of the automobile insurance in the United States, offered a plan quite similar to
the one in New York. See Am. INS. Ass'N, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMIITEE TO STUDY
AND EVALUATE THE KEETON-O'CONNELL BASIC PROTECTION PLAN AND AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT
REPARATIONS (1968).

53 See King, supra note 20, at 293.
54 See Q. JOHNSTONE & D. HoPsoN, LAWYERS AND THEI WORK 63-64 & n.127 (1967).
55 N.Y COURT RULES, APP. DIv, F nST & SECOND DEP'Ts, pt. 4, R. IV (McKinney 1970).
56 See FOURTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 32, at 221-24, 235. The overall state

figures for supreme court cases show that plaintiff recoveries in jury and nonjury trials
were virtually the same; however, in New York City, four out of the five counties reported
that plaintiffs received much higher awards from juries. Similarly, in the civil court,
juries were about four times more generous than judges.
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assuming that all the obstacles to enactment of an efficient, logical and
equitable system of compensation are overcome, the system will still
be of only limited territorial applicability. Recognition of motoring
accidents and injuries as not merely local matters, but rather as generating problems of national concern would be a wise, if difficult, political
decision.

